RBL's growth story: similar to some other banks: suggestions to regulator
RBL
Bank’s Growth and Financials : Some Thoughts
RBL
Bank is among the few private sector banks in India that grew their balance
sheet substantially in the last five years. Post IPO 2016, the bank’s
presentation included a ‘vision 2020’ statement, as per which goals were fixed
for each FY up to Mar 2020 for achieving
o
CAGR
(compound annual growth rate) of 30-35% under loans and
o
non-interest
income to contribute at least one third of net total income
The
achievements for the respective quarters/years in relation to the set goals was
made part of the bank’s presentation to the investors.
(Rs.
in Cr.)
Head |
2015-16 |
2016-17 |
2017-18 |
2018-19 |
Increase
in 2018-19 over 2015-16 (%) |
Deposits |
24,349 |
34,588 |
43,902 |
58,394 |
140 |
Advances |
21,229 |
29,449 |
40,268 |
54,308 |
156 |
Total
Business |
45,578 |
64,037 |
84,168 |
112,702 |
147 |
Investments |
14,436 |
13,482, |
15,448 |
16,840 |
17 |
Total
Net Income |
1310 |
1977 |
2834 |
3982 |
204 |
Non-Interest
|
491 |
755 |
1068 |
1442 |
194 |
Net
Profit* |
292 |
446 |
635 |
867 |
197 |
*(Due
to retained earnings and monies raised through equity, the net worth also went
up from Rs.2, 960 cr. in Mar 2016 to Rs.7,336 cr. in Mar 2019)
Trend Reversed?: After four quarters of dip in the net profit, when compared with the corresponding periods of the previous year, the bank reported an increase of 165% in the net profit (Rs.144 cr.) for the quarter ended Sep 2020 vis-à-vis the results posted in Sep 2019. The turnaround was made possible due to the following reasons.
(i)
The
credit portfolio, which was earlier tilted towards wholesale banking, is now dominated by exposure to non-whole sale
banking
(Loans
to Non-Wholesale Banking: Wholesale banking is now at 57:43 as against 45:55 a
year ago)
(ii)
The
addition to NPAs during the Sep 2020 quarter was Rs.145 cr. while the additions
were Rs.1377 cr. in Sep 2019.
(iii)
The
bank was able to reduce the interest expenses by Rs.110 cr., while retaining
the total income at the same level
(iv)
The
base figure for comparison was the net profit achieved in Sep 19, which was
lower at Rs.54 cr.
'High Risk' Concerns: Whether the success story will continue in future, depends on several factors like the impact of COVID on credit growth, delinquencies in credit portfolio, etc. Though the focus is now more on retail banking, there are ‘high risk’ concerns if one goes through the financials of the Bank.
a. The bank’s stupendous growth under interest income and other income are due to the more than exceptional growth achieved in the following non-wholesale banking sub-segments
Loans outstanding (Rs. in cr.)
Head |
Mar 2018 |
Mar 2019 |
Mar 2020 |
Sep 2020 |
Credit Cards |
2244 |
5283 |
10509 |
11286 |
Micro Finance |
3560 |
5028 |
6445 |
6686 |
LAP |
4161 |
6453 |
7591 |
7979 |
Total of sub-segments |
9965 |
16764 |
24545 |
25951 |
% of sub-segments above to non-whole sale banking |
62 |
70 |
75 |
81 |
The above three portfolios account for 46% of total advances as on Sep 30, 2020. Though every bank has given a positive picture so far on their exposure to credit cards, micro finance and loans against property, they remain the most vulnerable areas in the post COVID scenario.
b. Credit Card Outstanding at Rs.11,286 cr. accounts for 20% of gross advances. Nearly, 80% of the above are in the nature of revolving/term repayment facility. Out of the total non-interest income of Rs.456 cr. in Sep 2019, Rs.202 cr. came from credit cards. The increased dependence on credit cards for interest and non-interest income exposes the income of the bank to concentration risk to a particular credit portfolio.
c. As on 31st March 2020, 41% of its total advances were unsecured (5% in whole sale and 36% in non-wholesale)
d. The bank said in the press release “Net Interest Income is sequentially down due to proactive reversal of interest income on Non-Wholesale Advances expected to slip by Q3 FY21”. (Emphasis mine)
(i) Banks
were asked to build Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB) and the mandate is 1.875%
over and above the CAR requirements of 9.0%. Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer
(CCCB), which requires the banks to build up buffers during good times, is yet
to be introduced by RBI, as the Credit to GDP is still negative. Each bank is
required to have the same CCB, irrespective the credit growth achieved in a
particular year/period and no distinction is made between banks showing
exceptional credit growth and the other banks which are in line or below the
average credit growth of the industry. This should be corrected. To start with,
banks achieving more than 25% credit growth/ 10% more than industry average,
for more than two consecutive years, or where the exposure to the unsecured
segment is higher than 25%, shall be mandated to keep a CCB of 50 basis points
over and above that is stipulated for the banking industry. It serves as a cushion during times of stress
and more importantly conveys to the stake holders that the bank’s credit growth
is much higher than the industry average.
(ii) Periodicity of on-site inspection can be shorter and additional off-site monitoring reports can be introduced for banks achieving exceptional credit growth for two consecutive financial years.
2.
Rating Agencies:
(i)
While
rating the banks for their debt instruments/CD programme, credit rating
agencies do point out the weaknesses and also highlight the key sensitivities
that might call for review of the ratings. The rating continues normally for
one year. Where the credit growth is more than the normal or when the
concentration on the unsecured is on the increase, the credit rating agencies
shall get a mandate to review their ratings half yearly.
(ii)
While
growth in revenues and business form the backbone of higher ratings, the rating
agencies should work out a methodology for indicating the future uncertain
risks due to higher business growth. It may issue two ratings, one based on the
present financial position and the other - a contingent rating, if the future
uncertainties materialise. In the alternative, if the growth carries uncertain
future risks which are not visible today, it can award the rating based on the
present performance and indicate the outlook taking into account the
uncertainties.
3.
DICGC Cover for deposits: Whenever a bank is under stress,
there is an outflow of deposits as the monies deposited are unsecured. To
mitigate the problems faced by the depositors, DICGC Insurance has been enhanced to
Rs.5 lacs (from Rs.1 lac) for all the banks. The premium to be paid is the same
to all the banks. Banks with higher credit growth or having higher exposure in enhanced
credit risk sectors, shall be asked to pay more premiums. For this purpose, risk based premium based on
the ratings assigned for deposits (rating is now available only for CDs. It
should be introduced for all deposits including retail deposits).
Publishing of ratings for accepting retail deposits and the premium structure
for different banks based on their ratings shall be displayed in the banks' websites/advertisements and in all their branches. This will enable a depositor to take an informed decision, when he place his deposit in a bank. This will also promote risk based pricing for deposits.
V.Viswanathan
2nd November 2020
The suggestion on extra buffer of CCB looks like penalising growth. CCB increase should be linked to corresponding increase in deposits from public NOT on business growth. Or CCB should only be on unsecured exposure but then this is also taken cate in risk weighted approach. The suggestion implies growth is bad.
ReplyDeleteThe inspections should not be a burden to bank. Instead an API with bank's audit system should be taken by RBI, so that inspection can be on TAP without disturbing or wasting any one's time.
It is not penalisng growth Murali. Banker is a trustee and lends his money 3% and public money 97%. I have never suggested for CCB to come in for any amount of growth. Only when there is more than 50% growth yoy or when the growth is two digits higher than the average growth of the industry or when you grow your high risk assets (more than 100% risk assets) at a faster pace than the secured ones, the extra CCB should kick in. It should be mandatory and not voluntary. When it becomes mandatory, you need to explain in the notes to accounts or in disclosure and stat audit also should comment. That will put the public especially depositors on notice that their monies are lent at a higher pace than the industry or that they are in high yielding yet high risk assets. Remember Yes Bank with such a high CAR reducing to less than regulatory levels overnight.
DeleteA thorough, clear analysis of the financials of the Bank. Kudos to Mr. V Viswanathan.
ReplyDeleteAs pointed out by the author, the regulator's, Reserve Bank's, vigilance is essential. RBI/ statutory Auditors' must examine thoroughly and come out with reports and comments for corrective action, if needed.
Ultimately, Depositors interest is supreme. Any lax on the part of the Regulator/Auditors will cause hardships and miseries to the savers, as we witnessed in the case of PMC Bank, Mumbai.
Yes Bank Customers were lucky to a great extent, but it was Public Sector Banks' money that was deployed to save the Yes Bank for imminent collapse. Customers who were cajoled to invest in capital-bonds have lost their savings.
De-linked by RBI, an independent audit authority in the lines of CAG with Parliamentary perusal is needed for Banks in the country. RBI's autonomy or expertise in this regard are seen lost as evidenced by many a bank/NBFC failures, recent and past.
Thank you
DeleteA thorough, clear analysis of the financials of the Bank. Kudos to Mr. V Viswanathan.
ReplyDeleteAs pointed out by the author, the regulator's, Reserve Bank's, vigilance is essential. RBI/ statutory Auditors' must examine thoroughly and come out with reports and comments for corrective action, if needed.
Ultimately, Depositors interest is supreme. Any lax on the part of the Regulator/Auditors will cause hardships and miseries to the savers, as we witnessed in the case of PMC Bank, Mumbai.
Yes Bank Customers were lucky to a great extent, but it was Public Sector Banks' money that was deployed to save the Yes Bank for imminent collapse. Customers who were cajoled to invest in capital-bonds have lost their savings.
De-linked by RBI, an independent audit authority in the lines of CAG with Parliamentary perusal is needed for Banks in the country. RBI's autonomy or expertise in this regard are seen lost as evidenced by many a bank/NBFC failures, recent and past.